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This thesis examines the current policy and procedures used to manage naval
aviation configuration control. It recommends that the Navy consult with SABRE
Decision Technologies, or a company with a similar background, to re-engineer
the process for approving configuration changes and create an information
technology system to manage the process.
During this study, I have identified two major challenges to naval aviation
configuration policy. They are: (1) the process used to review and approve
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) is too complex and has too many
stakeholders and (2) the current method for management of approved
configuration changes is man-hour intensive, has potential for admimstrative error,
and requires physical inspection to positively verify aircraft and equipment
configurations.
Finally, this study presents the theory that there are many common
requirements between naval aviation maintenance and commercial airline
maintenance. We should take advantage of the experience and technological
innovations of industry and use them to make our configuration policy, and our
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As aviation technology becomes more complex, the Navy must find new ways to meet the
challenge of controlling the many different operating configurations of aircraft, avionics systems
and maintenance support equipment found in the fleet. For example, in the F/A-18 A/B/C/D
aircraft, there are 21 production lots of aircraft. [Ref 1] By definition, every production lot of
F/A-18 aircraft will have a different configuration. Added to this problem is the fact that there are
concurrent upgrades to the avionics systems and computer software while the aircraft are in
production and after they have been purchased by the government. Therefore, in the case of the
F/A-18, every production aircraft may have a slightly different configuration depending on which
lot it was produced in and the changes/modifications that have been incorporated into that
particular aircraft.
The Navy's Aviation System Configuration Management Policy is governed by the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Instruction 4130. 1C. By NAVAIR's definition,
Configuration management is the discipline involving technical and administrative
direction and surveillance for:
a. Identifying and documenting the functional and physical characteristics of a
configuration item.
b. Auditing configuration items and their related documentation to verify
conformance to specifications, interface control documents ...(compatibility
requirements)..., and other contractual requirements.
c. Controlling changes to configuration items and their related documentation.
d. Recording and reporting information which is essential for managing
configuration items effectively, including the status of all proposed and approved changes.
[Ref. 2: p. 2]
A configuration item is any "aggregation of hardware/software, or any of its discrete
components, which satisfies an end use function and is designated by the Government for
configuration management." [Ref. 2:p. A-l] The current configuration item change process
requires that all proposed changes, known as Engineering Change Proposals (ECP), Rapid Action
Minor Engineering Changes (RAMEC), or requests for major/critical deviation and waivers
affecting configuration items be submitted to the NAVAIR Change Control Board (CCB) for
approval.
At times, ECPs involve critical safety of flight issues and can be hand carried to the
chairmen and the four voting members of the CCB for authorization and approval.
[Ref. 2:p. 6-7,8] However, the normal procedure requires the proposed changes to pass through
a ten step process that includes staffing the change through, at a minimum, seven different
competencies and the program office before a decision is made to forward the proposal to the
CCB. If the proposal is forwarded, it is assembled into a package that for a Class I ECP, as
defined by MIL-STD-480B, can contain up to twelve separate forms. The proposed change then
goes before the CCB for final approval. [Ref. 2:p. 6-7] Once the proposed change is approved
by the CCB, the ECP becomes a directive from COMNAVAIR to the office of primary
responsibility (usually the Program Office), all affected NAVAIR codes and the fleet.
[Ref. 2:p. 6-9]
As would be expected, any change to an aviation configuration item has the potential to
affect the designed performance of the system. This could lead to disastrous consequences in the
demanding flight environment ofNaval Aviation. For this reason, the ECP process is subject to
close scrutiny by the chairman and voting members of the Change Control Board.
Membership on the NAVAIR Change Control Board will consist of experienced,
qualified representatives from configuration management, systems engineering, production
management, logistics support, contracts, aviation training, and other areas as may be
required. [Ref 2:p. 5-8]
The process requires extensive coordination between the program office and the
competencies of the voting members and support staffs at NAVAIR that were described above.
Under the current process, the average ECP takes 128 days to be approved. [Ref 3] After
approval, there is still a high level of coordination required to make the approved changes in the
fleet and document the new change to the previous configuration. According to Captain Steve
Heilman, Director ofNaval Aviation Maintenance Programs and Policy, "current estimates
suggest that it takes an average of twelve years for an approved Depot-level TDC mod kit to be
installed in every target BuNo" (aircraft). [Ref. 4:p. 2] Clearly, there is still much work to be
done even after the change is approved. Additionally, until every system affected by the change
has been modified, there will be systems in the fleet that have different configurations.
Once the change has been approved, the Program Manager (PM), or in some cases the
contractor, is responsible to develop the configuration management plan which will define the
configuration item and procedures for configuration management application, tailoring, tasks,
participants and their roles. [Ref. 2:p. 2-1] In short, the PM must develop the plan and manage
the implementation of the change throughout the life cycle of the configuration item.
Managing the administrative processing and actual incorporation ofECPs presents a
challenge to Naval Aviation. The Naval Aviation Logistics Command Information System
(NALCOMIS) was developed to assist in this effort but according to a representative from the
F/A-18 Program Office [Ref. 5] and a fleet representative [Ref. 6], configuration management
problems persist. These problems will be discussed in detail in Chapter III.
However, we are not alone. The commercial airline industry is faced with the same
problems. According to Heizer and Render (1996), "For a complex product that has a long
manufacturing cycle, such as a Boeing 747 jumbo jet, the changes may be so numerous that no
two 747s are built exactly alike - which is indeed the case. [Ref. 7:p. 228]
Several commercial airlines including American, Northwest, Canadian, and Cathay Pacific
use an information technology (IT) product developed by SABRE Decision Technologies to
control their aircraft configurations and maintenance records. It may be possible for the Navy to
use a similar system to manage our configuration control process.
B. METHODOLOGY
Data have been gathered for this study from current Navy instructions, Navy maintenance
manuals, newspaper and magazine articles, textbooks, and classroom lectures. Additionally, the
F/A-18 Program Office has provided data on the ECP process and problems associated with
implementing ECPs, the draft requirements document that describes requirements for a proposed
Automated Maintenance Environment (AME), and various instructions and memos regarding
configuration management. A representative from Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(COMNAVAIRPAC) has provided more data on current issues and problems with configuration
management and other data has been gathered from searches conducted on the worldwide web
Also, personnel from the SABRE Decision Technologies have assisted me with the
collection of various forms of data concerning their configuration management system, its'
operation, and benefits and costs of using IT to perform configuration management. Additionally,
they provided answers to my specific questions via telephone or e-mail. SABRE also visited with
the students and faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School on 6 February, 1997 to discuss the
capabilities of the CM system.
Finally, a representative from the RAND National Defense Research Institute made data
available on Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and discussed process re-engineering as it relates
to organizations plans to adopt any new IT system to manage complex processes.
The data will be used to define the Navy's Configuration Management process, identify
problems with the current process and identify requirements for future configuration management
systems. For this study, I have identified an information system developed by SABRE Decision
Technologies for Aircraft Configuration Management. The system is used by the commercial
airlines to maintain their aircraft configuration control.
I intend to study SABRE' s Configuration Management system and make
recommendations regarding its' utility to the Navy for managing our configuration control policy.

II. NAVY CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
A. CURRENT PROCESS
The Navy's current configuration management policy is a top level process managed by
the NAVAIRSYSCOM. NAVAIR sets the policy, governs the operation of all Change Control
Boards (CCBs), and approves/disapproves all configuration management plans. [Ref. 2:p. 2-3]
Additionally, NAVAIR delegates authority to the Office of Primary Responsibility, usually the
Program Offices, to provide configuration management of assigned configuration items
throughout their life cycle. [Ref. 2: p. 2]
The change approval process at NAVAIR is a 10 step process generally depicted in




Proposed Change Receipt and Evaluation
2. Proposed Change Coordination & Formal Staffing
3. CCB Preparation, Approval & Direction
4. Implementation of Approved Change
5. Change Status
There are 10 steps in the change process that govern the processing of all changes brought
before NAVAIR for approval.
STEP 1 : The first step occurs when a change to a configuration item, proposed by a
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Figure 1 . ECP Process at NAVAIRSYSCOM From Ref. [2],
information is entered in the Modification Management Information System (MODMIS) where
the proposed change is assigned a tracking number that is used to determine status.
[Ref. 2: p. 6-1]
STEP 2: After the proposed change is logged into the MODMIS tracking system, it is
forwarded to the Office of Primary Responsibility for action.
STEP 3: The Office of Primary Responsibility has responsibility for staffing the proposed
change through all appropriate competencies. Then the Office of Primary Responsibility conducts
an ECP Evaluation and Planning Conference and makes the decision on whether or not to
proceed with the proposed change. The Evaluation and Planning Conference will include, as a
minimum, representatives from the following functional areas; AIR-02(Contracts),
AIR-04(Logistics), AIR-05 (Engineering), AIR- 1003(Automated Systems Analysis),
AIR-114(Production Management), and PMA-205(Aviation Training Systems Program Office).
Others may attend if required. [Ref. 2:p. 6-2]
STEP 4: Once the decision is made to process the proposed change, the Office of Primary
Responsibility issues a Decision Memorandum to ATR-1006, AIR-02, AIR- 1003,
AIR-08P(Budget), AIR-04, AIR-05, PMA-205 and all other concerned parties. A sample
Decision Memorandum is contained in Appendix A. Copies of the proposed ECP will be
forwarded with the Decision Memorandum. [Ref. 2:p. 6-3]
STEP 5: The Office ofPrimary Responsibility prepares the Change Control Board
package to be submitted to the NAVATR CCB via AIR 1006. The contents of this package will
vary, depending on the type of change being requested. In the case of an ECP, up to 12 different
forms are required to prepare a complete CCB Change Package. A list of the forms required for
the preparation ofCCB change packages appears in Appendix B. [Ref. 2:p. 6-3, 6-4]
STEP 6: The NAVAIR competencies identified in STEP 4 provide their inputs to the
Office of Primary Responsibility who compiles the inputs and presents the complete package to
AIR- 1006. [Ref. 2:p. 6-5, 6-6]
STEP 7: AIR- 1006 verifies the CCB change package, updates the MODMIS, and
schedules the proposed change for a formal CCB hearing. [Ref. 2:p. 6-6]
STEP 8 & 9: The NAVAIR Change Control Board meeting is held and the proposed
change is approved/disapproved. [Ref. 2:p. 6-7]
STEP 10: After approval of the change, the Office of Primary Responsibility must notify
the change originator and all implementing codes that the proposed change has been approved.
Additionally, the Office of Primary Responsibility must ensure that all approved actions are
carried out as directed by the CCB and maintain configuration status accounting of the weapons
system modification process. [Ref. 2: p. 6-9, 6-10]
B. CHANGE INCORPORATION
Once the change has been approved, it is released to the fleet for incorporation and
inclusion in applicable maintenance manuals and/or procedures. The change can be distributed via
message or letter, depending on the urgency of the requirement for the change. An example of an
Avionics Change (AVC) for the F/A-18 aircraft is contained in appendix C.
Using the F/A-18 AVC as an example, it can be seen that it contains:
1 . Cognizant Codes and Points of Contact
10




4. Purpose of the Change












1 5 Related Instructions/Information
An example of a maintenance publications change for the T58-GE-16 engine on the
CH-46 is contained in Appendix D.
The F/A- 1 8 message and the CH-46 publication change have similar formats. Both
changes require that a Visual Identification System/Maintenance Action Form (VTDS/MAF) be
submitted to document compliance with the technical directive. Additionally, the changes require
a logbook entry in the technical directives section to document that the change has been
incorporated.
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C. CONFIGURATION STATUS ACCOUNTING
In addition to documenting changes to configuration items on VTDS/MAFs and updating
the technical directive section of the logbook, a report describing the modification must be made
to the Technical Directive Status Accounting (TDSA) Program. The TDSA "was developed to
gather data on technical directive application and incorporation status as related to aircraft,
engines, support equipment, maintenance trainers and serial numbered weapons system
components." It is managed by the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office. [Ref. 2:p. 7-2]
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III. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
A. BACKGROUND
As the technical complexity ofnew weapons systems increases, Naval Aviation is faced
with an increasingly challenging task of managing configuration control. Ultimately, the
consequences of failing to maintain accurate configuration control of assets will result in a
degraded state of Operational Readiness. Specific examples of the effects on configuration
control breakdowns are that:
1
.
Product documentation no longer reflects the characteristics of the actual products
being procured because of unapproved/undocumented changes that were made after
the design phase.
2. Logistics support data no longer corresponds to configuration items making it difficult
for the fleet to properly maintain and operate the equipment.
3. Products are immobilized while corrected supporting documentation can be published.
4. Increased scrap, rework, and stock result. [Ref. 8: p. 3]
Configuration Management breakdowns also have significant affects on aviation support
equipment in the fleet. Commander Mike Hardee, the Maintenance Officer at Commander, Naval
Air Force, Pacific Fleet, described an example of a breakdown in configuration control of
Automatic Test Equipment (ATE). Hardee (1996) noted that "for aircraft, components and
rolling stock, much of the lack of configuration control is attributable to a loss of discipline on the
part of engineering, logistics and maintenance personnel relative to the established processes." He
states that "the problem with ATE's is that there is no formal process to track configuration
13
control." Therefore, each ATE custodian must contact the ATE's Cognizant Field Activity to
determine if the ATE has the most current documentation/software. [Ref. 6:p. 1]
Finally, Hardee (1996) believes that the larger problem with our management of
configuration control is that the Navy has demonstrated "...a failure to get information to user
activities in a manner that is: timely (so that it stays abreast of configuration updates),
comprehensive and accurate (so that it precludes maintenance malpractice) and controlled (so that
it can be inventoried and accounted for)." The Navy's determination to provide the fleet with the
most up to date equipment has overcome our ability to provide the necessary logistic support.
These problems have caused disruptions in the logistics pipelines and have, in some cases,
jeopardized the safety of personnel in the fleet. [Ref. 6:p. 1]
The previous paragraphs give general examples of problems with configuration
management. It can be seen that failure to maintain configuration control at the Systems
Command level and in the fleet can result in serious consequences. Here are two specific
examples where a breakdown in configuration management resulted in potentially life threatening
situations.
B. AV-8B HARRIER EJECTION SEAT FIRING CONTROL HANDLE
On 1 March 1991, Aircrew Systems Change (ACC) No. 537 was issued for the T/AV-8B
aircraft. The purpose of this change was to change the shape and the flexibility of the lower
ejection handle for the ejection seat in the aircraft. A hazard had been identified where it was
possible for the ejection control handle to become entangled with the control stick when the seat
was in the full upright position. ACC 537 would eliminate the possibility of an inadvertent
14
ejection caused by interference with the control stick by reducing the circumference of the
ejection control handle and making the ejection control handle material less flexible. [Ref 9:p. 2]
This change should have corrected the hazard that was identified by the operators in the
fleet. However, a breakdown in the configuration management process occurred which allowed
the original handle to remain in the aircraft. In this case, the problem was not identified until
1996. Although the part numbers of the firing control handles were different, the National Stock
Number (NSN) remained the same. Squadrons that thought they had complied with the ACC 537
may have been flying aircraft with the old firing control handle instead of the new one.
Fortunately, this problem was identified by an alert maintenance technician who promptly
informed his chain of command. A hazardous material report was released and the Systems
Command and Type Commanders were notified of the problem. [Ref. 10]
Once the Naval Air Systems Command was informed of the problem, they developed a
method to ensure that the handles were removed from the aircraft and purged from the supply
system. The fleet was required to physically inspect every seat to verify that the correct handle
had been installed. If the correct handle had not been installed, the fleet was directed to make the
correct change to the seat using the redesigned handle. Additionally, the supply system was
directed to screen all NSNs in the system and eliminate all of the original firing control handles.
[Ref. 11]
After a complete physical inspection of the aircraft, 15 original handles were discovered.
[Ref. 10] [Ref. 12] This action was completed five years after ACC 537 was originally issued.
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C. F/A-18 POWER SUPPLY FOR AIR DATA COMPUTER
On 27 April 1993, Avionics Change (AVC) No. 4399 was released to provide instructions
to F/A-18 Organizational (O-level) and Intermediate (I-level) maintenance activities to correct a
problem with the Air Data Computer (ADC) in the aircraft. This change was designed "to reduce
ADC power supply circuit noise that may induce aircraft to pitch up/down." [Ref. 13:p. 1]
This change required O-level maintenance to remove the ADC from the aircraft for return
it to I-level maintenance where it would be changed. The change would eliminate power
transients that were thought to be causing the aircraft to pitch up/down when certain modes of the
autopilot were being used. This potential for aircraft pitch up/down resulted in the following
flight restrictions for all Lot XIII and below aircraft:
Do not engage barometric altitude hold feature when:
1. Flying below 5000 ft
2. IMC flight
3. Formation flight [Ref. 14]
However, AVC 4399 contained erroneous maintenance procedures that were discovered
after the change was issued. In order to correct discrepancies found in the original change,
Interim Avionics Change (IAVC) No. 4242, Revision A was issued on 27 April 1993. LAVC
4242 corrected the erroneous procedures found in AVC 4399 and added a ferrite bead to the
ADC power supply to contain noise that was generated by the electronics in the system. This
bulletin was to be completed not later than 60 days after receipt of the directive. [Ref. 15]
Unfortunately, the problem with locating, identifying and modifying ADCs continued. On
6 July 1995, Avionics Bulletin (AVB) 512, Revision A was issued to "ensure correct installation
of ferrite bead noise suppresser in ADC power supplies." [Ref. 16:p. 1] In August and
September of 1995, Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic and Commander, Naval Air Force,
16
Pacific required their units to conduct physical inventories of all ADC assets to ensure that they
had been updated in accordance with the bulletins. [Ref. 17:p. 1] [Ref. 18:p. 1] These procedures
were initiated because the Type Commanders had concerns that "100 percent compliance had not
been accomplished to date." [Ref. 19]
On 16 January 1996, AVB 512 was canceled by the Naval Aviation Depot at North
Island. [Ref. 20] It was replaced with Avionics Bulletin (AVB) 561 on 18 January 1996. AVB
561 was issued "to ensure that all P/N 403 1000-902 ADC power supplies have been replaced
with P/N 4031003-915 power supplies." [Ref. 21 :p. 1]
This is clearly an example of a breakdown in management's control over incorporation of
a change to the ADC. In this case, management's lack of total asset visibility required multiple
physical inspections to ascertain where the assets were located and to ensure that the required
changes had been incorporated. Furthermore an additional requirement for the fleet to provide
monthly reports were generated to track assets and verify change incorporation. [Ref. 17]
[Ref. 18] According to the bulletins, the total time required for avionics technicians to complete
the actions described in each of the above technical directives was approximately 13 hours (O and
I-level labor) per computer. This does not include administrative time to check/update logs and
records. In addition to the man hours required to complete these actions, all Lot XIQ and below
F/A-18 aircraft remained under the flight restrictions in effect from [Ref. 14]. Those flight
restrictions have been in effect for three years.
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D. SUMMARY
The previous situations are glimpses at the potential ramifications ofbreakdowns in the
configuration management process. These are only two examples of problems that are being
faced every day in the fleet. In both cases, it was necessary for the fleet to conduct physical
inventories of all affected components to positively verify that the correct changes had been
incorporated. We have placed the burden on the users in the fleet to compensate for our inability
to manage configuration control. The time and effort expended by maintenance and support
personnel to solve problems such as these is detracting from their ability to focus on other mission
critical areas and detracting from the overall maintenance effort on our aircraft. There must be a
better way to manage this process.
In the next chapter, I will look at a commercial information technology (IT) system that is
used by the airline industry for managing the configuration control process.
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IV. SABRE DECISION TECHNOLOGIES (SDT) CONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND
In 1991, American Airlines Decision Technologies (AADT) developed computerized
decision support tools to plan maintenance tasks and calculate the optimal number and location of
spare parts. [Ref. 22] In their first year of operation, the maintenance planning system and the
inventory control system saved American Airlines over $15 million. Saving money was not the
only benefit from creating these systems. There was a reduction in the time required to plan and
analyze alternatives. Mark Tedone, a director of the development effort, described the effect of
the time savings on the organization at American Airlines.
In addition to the fact that you can now generate a plan for our entire fleet in half an hour
or less, as opposed to taking two or three weeks in the past, you can use that spare time to
look at alternatives. It gave the analyst time to say: 'What can I do to make better use of
what we have' . It essentially turned the analyst, who in the past was a number cruncher,
into a real analyst. [Ref. 22]
The effectiveness of using information technology (IT) to assist with the maintenance and
engineering efforts of the commercial airlines created demand for a single integrated product to
manage the entire maintenance effort.
In 1995, AADT became SABRE Decision Technologies, a Division of the SABRE Group,
Inc. They developed the EMTECH system which was designed to be a "state-of-the-art




Increase efficiency and productivity in all major functional areas.
2. Provide an accurate tracking system.
3 Improve management effectiveness.
4. Streamline the business process.
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5. Facilitate customization for any size airline and repair station through modular design
features. [Ref. 23]
EMTECH is composed of four separate application modules as shown in Figure 2.
MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION MATERIAL ADMINISTRATION
Figure 2. EMTECH Application Modules From Ref. [23]
This grouping of application modules is "aimed at providing the client complete
automation in all mainstream activities, and assures the connectivity of information among
functional areas." [Ref. 23 :p. 2] Each module is broken up into various sub-modules as
determined by functionality. For this study, my focus will be on the Configuration Management



























Figure 3. EMTECH Maintenance Module From Ref. [23]
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Figure 3 shows the Configuration Management Module as it is integrated into the
EMTECH system. While it was designed to work with an EMTECH core data base, the
Configuration Management Module can be utilized as a stand-alone system with an existing
maintenance data base. [Ref. 23 :p. 10]
B. SDT CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT MODULE
The commercial airline industry has recognized that management of configuration control
is critical for the safe operation of aircraft. Additionally, failing to accurately manage aircraft and
component configurations can result in inefficient asset allocation and increased maintenance
costs. According to SDT,
Ensuring correct aircraft configuration and service records of critical aircraft components
are two of the difficult and time consuming tasks necessary for safe operation. Failing to
perform these assignments can shorten the life of expensive components and increase
aircraft downtime. [Ref. 24:p. 1]
SDT's answer to configuration management was an electronic decision support tool that
would manage the complexity of maintaining configuration control while using the benefits of
computer technology to allow managers to quickly and accurately monitor status of critical parts
and create tailored reports for specific items of interest.
SDT's Configuration Management Module "runs in a client-server environment using a
UNIX file server, Oracle relational database management system, and a Windows-based PC
workstation." [Ref. 24] The graphic user interface (GUI) looks similar to other Windows
applications. It uses a mouse driven interface with pull-down menus, pop-up dialog boxes, and
fast keys. [Ref. 24] An example of the Configuration Management display showing an assembly
parts screen that is used for configuration management is displayed in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. SDT Assembly Parts Screen From Ref. [25]
The assembly parts screen has four sub-sections that are used for configuration
management. Starting from the top of the display, they are; the assembly logical build section, the
current component information section, the attached service bulletin section and the unattached
parts section.
1. Assembly Logical Build Section
The assembly logical build section, located at the top of the assembly parts screen display,
is used to display configuration items by serial number from the assembly level to the individual
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piece parts that make up that particular assembly. An example of a assembly logical build section
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Figure 5. SDT Assembly Logical Build From Ref [25]
In Figure 5, an engine assembly with serial number 709918 has been selected for viewing.
The display shows that this particular assembly contains four modules. In this case, since none of
the four modules have been highlighted, the system defaults to display the sub-assemblies for the
top module with manufacturer's serial number K9918C. Therefore, we can see that module
K9918C has five sub-assemblies. Once again, the system defaults to display the piece parts of the
top sub-assembly if no other sub-assemblies have been highlighted. In this case, there are thirty-
eight piece-parts associated with sub-assembly number K9918N1.
The maximum number of modules, sub-assemblies, and piece parts that can be displayed at
one time is four. However, the operator is cued to the fact that there are more modules, sub-
assemblies or piece parts to be viewed by the numbers (when greater than four) at the bottom of
each column and the checkerboard pattern in the scroll boxes to the left of the columns.
[Ref. 25 :p. 4]
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2. Current Component Info Section
The center section of the assembly parts screen contains current component information.
This information is broken up into two parts. The first part of the display contains information
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Figure 6. SDT Current Component Info From Ref. [25]
In this example, it can be seen that the highlighted part with manufacturer's serial number
M53643 is installed on base engine number 709918 in position 2 on an aircraft with tail number
259. At the time the part was installed, it had 67,207 hours and 6,337 cycles remaining in its'
service life. [Ref. 25 :p. 6]
The second part of the current component information section displays information on the
selected part that is valid for the time that is entered in the effective date portion of the display.
This section is displayed in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. SDT Current Component Info From Ref. [25]
In this example, as of 05/02/95, there are 81,752 hours and 15,408 cycles remaining on
the selected part. Additionally, using actual operations data from the central database, the system
calculates the average usage of the part and uses that information to forecast the estimated date
for expiration of service life. In this case, the part averages 8.27 hours and 4. 16 cycles per day.
Based on that usage, the part will last for another 3,700 days. Its' estimated expiration of service
life at those rates will be on 06/18/95. [Ref. 25 :p. 6]
3. Attached Service Bulletin Section
The attached service bulletin section of the configuration management system contains
pertinent information on open and closed service bulletins for the selected part. All service
bulletins (open and closed) that pertain to the selected part are automatically displayed. An
example of the Attached Service Bulletins section is contained in Figure 8.
In this example, there are twenty-five service bulletins associated with the selected part.
This section displays the service bulletin number, the accomplishment code (how/when the service
bulletin should be accomplished), and the date that the service bulletin was accomplished. If more
information on the service bulletin is desired, the operator can select the Run SB box on the lower
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Figure 8. SDT Attached Service Bulletins From Ref. [25]
right hand portion of the display. This will bring up the Service Bulletin Screen displayed in
Figure 9.
:««««««» ;^^^x^wecwTC^^x^w^^ wx\Tvcre^-y-xccocTOTCq<tts
Figure 9. SDT Service Bulletin Screen From Ref. [26]
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The service bulletin screen gives the operator an in-depth look at the service bulletins that
were displayed in the Attached Service Bulletins section on the assembly parts screen.
Additionally, the operator can view other service bulletins, edit service bulletins, query parts
associated with service bulletins and detach parts, as desired. [Ref. 26:p. 3-13]
The system will allow the operator to change virtually everything about the desired service
bulletin except four critical fields. These four fields are the Industry Identification Number (IIN),
the Type Equipment (Type Eq) code, the service bulletin number, and the accomplishment code
(ACM CD). These fields can only be created or altered by a central database manager. This
function protects the system from corruption by inadvertent operator errors. [Ref. 26. p. 4] Figure
10 displays a warning that would be displayed to the operator if he/she tried to enter a service
bulletin number of an already existing service bulletin.
Figure 10. SDT Service Bulletin Conflict Warning From Ref. [26]
4. Unattached Parts Section
When changes are made to configuration items, the unattached parts section is used to




mfs m\ iiha nm m<;< ism
Figure 1 1 . SDT Unattached Parts Section From Ref. [25]
Using the unattached parts section, the operator highlights the part that he/she wants to
attach to a configuration item. Then the assembly that will be modified is selected and the part is
moved to its' new position. Once the action is saved, the configuration is instantaneously
updated. [Ref. 25 :p. 12]
C. BENEFITS
The commercial airline industry uses this system to maintain accurate aircraft
configuration and maintenance records. It provides an accurate tracking tool for all parts and
allows planners to quickly and accurately forecast part service life and estimate dates for critical
component service requirements. Additionally, the system tracks current information on service
bulletins, engineering change orders and airworthiness directives. [Ref. 24 :p. 1]
Another benefit of the system is that it allows the operator to quickly retrieve and sort
data to verify configurations, forecast maintenance requirements, and determine what maintenance
tasks have been accomplished. Users can generate regular reports to allow maintenance managers
to monitor configuration control status, make plans for regular service, and monitor life history of
configuration items throughout their life cycle. [Ref. 24:p. 1-2]
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The system protects operators from inadvertently entering data incorrectly. This is
accomplished through the use of alerts to notify the operator of "illegal configurations, invalid
data entries, or significant changes to part age information (measured in hours, cycles, and days)."
[Ref 24: p. 2] Additionally, by using a central database, the system eliminates the potential for
data discrepancies by eliminating redundant data that exists in organizations that maintain separate
databases. This function reduces the problems associated with simple mistakes in documentation
that can lead to a loss of configuration control. [Ref. 24:p. 2]
Finally, SDT's Configuration Management system has a standard Windows graphic user
interface which operators are likely to be familiar with. It allows operators to quickly update the
database and complete transactions with the standard menus and point-and-click functions found
on other Windows software products. [Ref. 24: p. 2]
The next chapter will describe how the SDT Configuration Management System could
have prevented the problems with Navy Configuration Control that were discussed in Chapter III.
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V. BENEFITS OF SABRE DECISION TECHNOLOGIES (SDT)
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. GENERAL
The commercial airline industry uses information technology to manage many critical
aspects of aircraft maintenance, including incorporation and tracking of configuration changes to
their aircraft. Driven by a strong profit motive and desire to reduce costs while increasing
capacity, the industry has seen the benefits of using a computer system to maintain configuration
control.
At this point in my study, I wanted to present a cost benefit analysis to illustrate the
potential cost savings and benefits to be realized through the use of a configuration management
system. I asked two members of the SDT group to help me obtain data that had been used to
convince the top level decision makers in industry to accept the relatively high costs of
implementing a computer network to manage an entire commercial airlines maintenance effort.
Interestingly, there was never a formal cost benefit analysis or post-implementation
review. The benefits were so obvious to the maintenance personnel and top level managers that
the system basically sold itself outright. In fact, according to one of the engineers at SDT, "...this
was a quantum leap...the issue from the start was 'can it be done' rather than 'should it be done'.
[Ref 27:p. 2]
In general, while there has been no formal report of the benefits of using decision support
systems, there are some informal measures of effectiveness that have been observed. The largest
impact of implementing the configuration management system has been in the allocation and
distribution of materials. The configuration management system has given maintenance planners
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the capability to forecast upcoming requirements for assets and ensure that the proper materials
are available to maintenance technicians at the proper time. Total asset visibility (TAV) is a
competitive advantage for industry because they can use TAV to reduce total inventory of
material by accurately forecasting requirements and ensuring that only the necessary parts are
ordered to make the required configuration changes. Because the system allows the users to
forecast the exact requirements for parts, there is no need to create excess inventories to guard
against unexpected demand. If there is no unexpected demand for parts, the costs associated with
holding excess inventory for "unexpected demand insurance" can be eliminated. [Ref 28]
Another benefit of implementing the configuration management system has been in the
area of time savings. In one example, a 30 year old system that used overnight batch processing
was replaced with the real time system, developed by SDT, using a graphic user interface. When
the clerks saw that they could input data faster and more reliably, they were impressed. However,
in addition to reducing the time required to perform data entry and editing, the clerks found that
they could also reconcile differences in data much more quickly with a real-time system rather
than having to wait for the next days audit report from the old system. According to Lillo,
"Maintenance is taken seriously at American Airlines and it was clear this system would help the
clerks do their job better." [Ref 27:p. 2]
Another example of time savings has been realized at the commercial depots where the
time to update records for aircraft coming out of depot level maintenance has been reduced from
10-18 days to a maximum of two days. [Ref. 28]
The airlines saw the potential to increase their efficiency and effectiveness in managing the
complex requirements of aviation maintenance by using information technology to their
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advantage. In the following examples, I will discuss how the use of a configuration management
system could have prevented the Navy's problems with configuration control that I identified in
chapter III.
B. SPECIFIC
In this study, I have identified two specific examples ofbreakdowns in configuration
control. In both cases, the fleet was required to conduct a physical inventory of all configuration
items in question to positively identify their current configuration. This "last ditch" method to
maintain configuration control could have been avoided if the SDT Configuration Management
system had been in place. In the examples that follow, I will show how SDT's system could have
prevented the specific examples of configuration management breakdowns on the AV-8 Harrier
and the F/A- 18 Hornet.
1. AV-8 Harrier Ejection Seat Firing Control Handle
The ejection seat firing control handle for the AV-8 was re-designed to protect aircrews
from the possibility of inadvertently ejecting from the aircraft when the pilot's control stick
became entangled with the Ejection Seat Firing Control Handle. Unfortunately, both the old and
new ejection seat firing control handles were given the same National Stock Number (NSN). This
created a situation where old handles were still in inventory, and in 1 5 instances, still found
installed in operational aircraft. [Ref. 10] [Ref. 12]
The problem and the ensuing requirement for a physical inventory to verify current
configurations could have been avoided by using SDT's Configuration Management system.
Although the ejection seat firing control handles had the same NSN, they had different part
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numbers. The SDT system would have alerted the operator that a potential problem existed
because the database will not accept two different part numbers with the same NSN that are not
interchangeable. This alert would have given a "heads up" to the operators and the logistic
support pipeline personnel that the old handles needed to be purged from the system and/or the
new handles needed an new NSN. Regardless of those facts, the new service bulletin (ACC in
this case) could only have been accomplished by installing the correct ejection seat firing control
handle with the new part number. [Ref. 29]
With the SDT system, even if the initial conflict had not been identified, there would never
have been a requirement to conduct a physical inventory to positively determine the configuration
of the fleet's ejection seats. Using SDT's Configuration Management system, an exception report
could have created that would scan the current configuration status of all ejection seats and print
out a list of the seats that had not received the modified ejection seat firing control handles. Once
the assets that had not been modified were identified, the correct handles could have been sent to
the squadrons who had aircraft that needed to be retrofit. [Ref. 29]
2. F/A-18 Power Supply for Air Data Computer (ADC)
In this example, configuration control was lost because of a lack of asset visibility. Many
of the power supplies had been modified in accordance with an AVC and then corrected with an
IAVC. However, the problem was that without physically checking the ADCs, the operators in
the fleet and the logistics support personnel could not positively determine which boxes had
received the proper "fix". In this example, a Configuration Management system could have been
used to track the status of updates to the computers. The configurations of the ADCs on the
aircraft and in the shops would be in the database. Each computer could be identified by its serial
number. Additionally, the sub-assemblies and in some cases, the piece parts could be positively
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identified. As described in the first example, by running an exception report, the ADCs that had
not been modified correctly could be identified, modified, and returned to service.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
I conclude that there are two fundamental challenges that confront the current Naval
Aviation Configuration Management Policy: (1) the process used to review and approve
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) and (2) the management and control of the
configuration changes once they are approved and released to the fleet for incorporation.
1. ECP Review and Approval Process
The process is too complex and has too many stakeholders that must be satisfied
independently
For example, for a Class I ECP, there are up to twelve different forms that must be
completed and staffed through at least seven NAVAIR staffs for their concurrence. These staffs
route the ECP through their organizations and take input from the Type Commander. Once the
staffs have acknowledged their concurrence with the proposed ECP, the entire package is
collected by the program manager and submitted to the Configuration Change Control Board
(CCB) for final approval. The average time to complete this process, from ECP proposal to
approval, is 128 days. [Ref. 3]
This process is similar, on a smaller scale, to a challenge that the nation of Singapore was
facing when it resolved to control the entire nations import/export industry by using Electronic
Data Interchange (EDI). In 1987, Singapore's trade governing agencies were executing about
10,000 transactions per day. Each transaction required at least four documents to be completed.
In some cases, as many as twenty forms were required to complete a transaction. All
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documentation was hand carried by courier and the average turnaround time for each transaction
was two days. "Swedish and U.S. studies of the costs of trade documentation in those countries
estimated that the cost at 4% to 7% of the value of goods shipped." [Ref 30:p. 192]
Singapore created a joint government/commercial trade information system called
TradeNet. They took all of the forms required for import/export transactions and consolidated
them into one form. Not only did they consolidate the forms required to approve import/export
transactions, they created a new process, supported by an EDI system, that was capable of
accepting and approving a transaction in less than 10 minutes. [Ref. 30:p. 203] If an entire
country can work together to create an electronic system that can approve and document
import/export transactions on one electronic form, we should be able to consolidate our ten
different ECP staffing/concurrence forms into one electronic form and distribute it electronically
through our organization, in parallel, for approval.
The current ECP process at NAVAIR is undergoing an internal review as the NAVAIR
organization shifts to the new Competency Aligned Organization (CAO) structure. This is a first
step in creating a new approach to configuration management policy. We must change the
process before we try to adapt new technology to an old process. According to RAND, "ifyou
use EDI only to transfer information electronically, but along the same lines of a previous manual
process (paving cowpaths), you may not see any improved responsiveness." [Ref. 31]
While I applaud NAVAIR' s initiative to re-engineer this process, I am concerned that an
internal review of the current process by the people who manage configuration policy on a daily
basis will only result in recommendations for incremental changes to the existing policy. The
people who have been charged with this review have been placed in an unenviable position. They
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have been asked to determine if the jobs that they perform on a day to day basis are required. It is
difficult enough to be objective when other people's jobs are at stake, but almost completely
impossible for any one to eliminate their own position. Furthermore, by asking them to perform
this study, we are reducing their effectiveness at performing their primary responsibilities by
placing new demands on their time to complete this study. We must find a neutral third party to
study the current process, interview the customers in the fleet and the program managers who
support them to find out what is really needed, and make recommendations to create fundamental
changes to support configuration management policy to guide us into the twenty-first century.
2. Configuration Change Management
Our method of managing configuration changes is man-hour intensive and has
potential for human error with every report that is transmitted through the chain of
command. It is a tribute to the dedication and hard work of the men and women at
NAVAIR and in the fleet who make the system work on a daily basis.
Once the CCB approves the ECP, the program office is charged with supporting
implementation of the change and tracking change incorporation for the rest of the configuration
items life cycle. For the F/A-18 program office, this involves tracking 568 ECPs contained in
approximately ten file cabinets that are located at NAVAIRSYSCOM in Washington, D.C.
[Ref. 32] F/A-18 uses a government contractor to manage configuration control. The fleet
makes the changes in accordance with the published ECP and reports incorporation of the change
by completing a VTDS/MAF and making the required annotations in the technical directives
section of the configuration item log book. This process is man-hour intensive and has potential
for operator error with every report that is transmitted through the chain of command. It is truly
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remarkable that the logisticians have been able to use the system at all. However, as described in
chapter III, when a configuration breakdown occurs, the consequences can be severe. Naval
aviation is an inherently dangerous business. Loss of configuration control can, at least require
physical inspection of all affected assets to positively ascertain their configuration. At worst, it
may lead to a loss of life and/or an inability to perform an assigned mission. As our resources for
logistics support continue to shrink, we must find ways to maximize the productivity of our
personnel and to minimize the costs associated with maintaining configuration control.
The Navy is currently developing the Automated Maintenance Environment (AME). It is
designed to contain a configuration management module. SDT's configuration management
module, or one like it, could be incorporated in AME. By incorporating SDT's Configuration
Management system into AME we may be able to contribute to the Navy's goal of maintaining
"affordable readiness" by using a system that has already been developed and has proven its'
merits to the civilian world. The Navy does not need to purchase another hardware system.
There have already been many systems fielded with varying levels of success. We should be
pursuing software solutions that are compatible with existing personal computers. Why should
we develop our own system when we can profit from the lessons learned by the commercial world
and not repeat their mistakes? Additionally, we should look to the commercial world for
assistance with the development of our requirements for our follow on aviation maintenance
support systems. In many cases, they are performing research on new technologies that we have
just begun to think about. When it comes to aircraft maintenance, our missions are astonishingly
similar. Whether the mission is carrying bombs over the beach to a target or passengers to their
destination, the requirement for an operational aircraft with full logistic support that will perform
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the mission and return to base safely is the same for all of us. We should take advantage of these
similarities with industry and use them to make our maintenance support more effective and
efficient.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
I have five specific recommendations.
1 . NAVAIRSYSCOM should consult with members of industry, such as SABRE Decision
Technologies, who have demonstrated experience in successfully re-engineering
commercial aircraft maintenance support processes to study the Configuration
Management Policy at NAVAIR. The goal of the study would be to re-engineer
NAVAIR's Configuration Management Policy to streamline the process, eliminate
redundancy, improve communication and serve the needs of the customer in the fleet.
2. Program Managers must be given a tool to ensure that they have accurate asset
visibility to effectively manage all configuration changes that affect their programs. The
Program Manager has been given the responsibility of managing his/her program from "cradle
to grave". I recommend that the Program Manager, with support from the Logistics and
Engineering competencies, be given a process that is supported by an information system like
the SDT Configuration Management system to manage his/her program's configuration
management policy to meet the needs of the fleet.
3
.
Configuration changes that are not mandatory to meet an Operational Requirement
and/or are not mandatory for safety of flight should not be considered for
incorporation. I recommend that proposed changes to any configuration be reviewed by the
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program office and the fleet to ensure that they are required for safety of flight or to meet an
existing operational requirement (OR) before configuration change request packages are
prepared. Any changes that do not meet one, or both of those criteria should not be brought
before the Program Manager for forwarding to the Configuration Change Board (CCB).
4 Solicit support from SABRE Decision Technologies, or a similar firm, to assist with the
integration of a configuration management module to The Automated Maintenance
Environment (AME). AME is in the developmental stages. I recommend that the SDT
Configuration Management System, or one like it, be integrated to operate with AME. This
would be an excellent test to determine the potential for adapting commercial software
applications to future military maintenance management systems.
5. Stop using precious resources to perform research and development on maintenance
management systems that already exist in the commercial world. I recommend that we
eliminate funding for research and development of decision support systems for
maintenance/logistics support. Our professional operators and support staffs know the
requirements of the fleet. They should define the requirements and then look to industry to
show us how to maximize our future capabilities. As discussed earlier, there are strong
parallels between the U.S. military aviation maintenance procedures and procedures used for
commercial aviation. The commercial processes have evolved to maximize capacity/output
and minimize cost/downtime. Can we afford to do anything less?
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Subj : DECISION MEMORANDUM FOR GRUMMAN ECP NO. GR-EA-6B-2 7 ;
CANOPY JETTISON HANDLE SAFETY LATCH DATED 1 TUBER 19 8 8
Note: Subject matter will be unclassified and must
include the name of the ECP Originator and the
configuration item affected.
Ref: (a) NAVAIRINST 413 0. 1C
End j (1) Draft Milestone Chart
1. The purpose of the subject ECP is to prevent inadvertent
jettison of the EA-6B canopy during normal flight operations.
2. As required by reference (a) , an ECP evaluation/planning
conference was held on 10 October 1988 with representatives from
the Contracts Division (AIR-2XXX) , the Aviation Systems Training
Program Office (PMA205XXX) , the Logistics Management Division
(AIR-4XXX) , and the Systems Engineering Division (AIR-5XXX)
.
Since the proposed ECP addressed both production and retrofit
requirements and would require government furnished equipment, a
representative from the Production Management Division (AIR-114)
was also in attendance. It was also determined that a Program
Management Proposal (PMP) and Approval for Production (AFP)
would be required prior to this change being approved and
incorporated.
3. As a result of this ECP evaluation/planning conference the
following actions were assigned:
a. PMAXXX (configuration manager, etc.) will be responsible
for coordinating program management proposal and production
approval requirements with AIR-801 and AIR-1003, and obtaining
the required concurrences.
b. PMAXXX will also be responsible for preparing the draft
Justification and Approval (J&A) in narrative form and monitor
its approval status. Technical program personnel will assist
the program office as may be required.
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c. AIR-02XXX will prepare the smooth J&A utilizing the
draft inputs provided by the program office. AIR-02XXX will
also assist PMA XXX in obtaining the required approvals.
d. AIR-04XXX will staff the change following AIR-04
internal procedures and will prepare and provide PMA XXX the
applicable Cost and Funding Summary and Milestone Chart for
inclusion into the formal CCT Change Request/Directive. The
APML will also coordinate the proposed change with AIR-552
(Support Equipment) and PMA 205 (Aviation Systems Training)
.
e. AIR-05XXX will staff the change following AIR-05
internal procedures and will prepare and provide PMAXXX the CCB
Change Request Directive (NAVAIR 4130/1) . AIR-05XXX will also
coordinate with AIR-04XXX, AIR-114 and PMA205 as applicable.
f. PMA205XXX will coordinate and provide all aviation
training inputs to AIR-04.
g. AIR-114XXX will provide AIR-05XXX with a completed GFE
requirements form for supporting the proposed change.
5. The staffing and implementation of the subject ECP will be
based on the following guidance:
a. NAVAIRHQ Routing Priority: Routine
b. Desired Production Effectivity: Serial No. P-72
c. Funding identified and reserved:
APN-1 thru 4 $ XXX, XXX. XX
APN-5 $ XXX, XXX. XX ''
APN-6 $ XXX, XXX. XX
O&MN $ XXX, XXX. XX
6. This change will be presented to the NAVAIR Change Control
Board on XX/XX/XX. Staffing of the subject ECP must be
completed and all inputs provided to PMA XXX by XX/XX/XX.
7. A draft milestone chart (NAVAIR 4130/3) identifying the
planned implementation of the change is provided as enclosure
(1) .
PMA XXX



































APPENDIX B. FORMS REQUIRED FOR THE PREPARATION
OF CCB CHANGE PACKAGES
A Change Control Board change reguest/directive must be prepared
and processed for all Class I engineering change proposals
(including value engineering change proposals) , requests for
major/critical deviations or waivers, RAMEC s, MGFEL's, work
completion date extensions, and revisions and/or documents
thereto. The chart below identifies which forms or documents
must be completed and included in a final change request/
directive package, when processing one of the following types of
change control board actions.
TYPES OF CHANGES
CCB CHANGE REQUEST/DIRECTIVE FORMS : ECP RFD RFW RAMEC MGFEL
1. NAVAIR CCB Change Request/Directive X X X X X
(NAVAIR 4130/1) Exhibit 6-5
2
.
Cost and Funding Summary X X * X
(NAVAIR 4130/2) Exhibit 6-6
3. Milestone Chart X X X X X
(NAVAIR 4130/3) Exhibit 6-7
4. Implementing Instructions X X X X X
(NAVAIR 4130/4) Exhibit 6-8




(NAVAIR 4130/5) Exhibit 6-9
6. Master Government Furnished * X X
Equipment List (MGFEL) Change
(NAVAIR 4130/6) Exhibit 6-10
7. Support Equipment Requirements * X
Form (NAVAIR 4130/7) Exhibit 6-11
8. CCB Change Request/Directive XXX X x
AIR-04 Staffing/Concurrence Form
(NAVAIR 4130/8) Exhibit 6-12
9. CCB Change Request/Directive ,-; X X X X X
AIR-05 staffing/Concurrence Form
(NAVAIR 4130/9) Exhibit 6-13
10. Controlling Custodian (TYCOM) ** X X
ECP Incorporation Plan Form
(NAVAIR 13061/9) Exhibit 6-14
11. CCB System Safety Assessment Form X
(NAVAIR 4130/10) Exhibit 6-15
12. Decision Memorandum, Exhibit 6-3 XXX X
* If Affected
** O & I Level Installations Only
ECP: Engineering Change Proposal
RFD: Request for Deviation
RFW: Request for Waiver
RAMEC: Rapid Action Minor Engineering Change
MGFEL: Master Government Furnished Equipment List
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APPENDIX C. SAMPLE AVIONICS CHANGE MESSAGE
RTTUZYUW RUE0MCA1335 16 20 20-UULA— kuhi unn .
ZNR UUUCX ZUI RULSSAZ1102 0161102
R 161102Z JAN 96 ZYB PSN 174186Q27
FM PEOTACAIR WASHINGTON DC//PMA265//
TO AIG ONE SIX FIVE
AIG SIX NINE EIGHT SIX





SUBJ/AVIONICS CHANGE NO. 4651/TD CODE 54/F/A-18 AIR DATA
COMPUTER (ADC) CP-1334/A/PROM UPDATE FROM P/N 4031000-912 TO P/N





REF/E/DOC/NAVAIR 1-1A-23/ 1FEB94/OR SUBQ//
REF/F/DOC/A1-250AC-560-000/CHGD 10DEC91/OR SUBQ//
REF/G/RMG/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM WASHINGTON DC/271940Z/27194 1ZAPR93/
/
REF/H/RMG/NADEP NI/ 130 731ZOCT95/-/NOTAL/
/
NARR/REF A IS LINE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES. REF B IS PLANE CAPTAIN
MANUAL. REF C IS LINE MAINTENANCE ACCESS DOORS. REF D IS AIR DATA
COMPUTER SYSTEM. REF E IS ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY REPAIR. REF F IS AIR




A. ENGINEERING: LCDR DAVE CULBERTSON , AIR 4.5.1.1, DSN
642-6240, EXT 8648 OR COML (703) 604-6240 EXT 8648
B. LOGISTICS: CAPT J. COPPOLA, AIR-3.1.1C. DSN 642-3160, EXT
2480 OR COML (703) 604-3160 EXT 2480.
C. ENGINEERING: NADEP NORIS CODE 4.3.5MS, M.J. SCHMIDT, DSN
735-3804 OR COML (619) 545-3804.
D. LOGISTICS: NADEP NORIS CODE 3.1.1.1.B7. G. WHITELOCK, DSN
735-3837 OR COML (619) 545-3837.
2. CATEGORY: ROUTINE
3. DOCUMENTATION AFFECTED:
A. A1-F18AC-560-300. DTD 15 APR 93
B. A1-F18AC-560-500. DTD 1 MAY 93
C. A1-250AC-560-000. DTD 15 APR 86 '
4. PURPOSE: TO MODIFY ADC, P/N (07187) 4031000-912 TO P/N (07187)
4031000-915. THIS CHANGE IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN CONJUNCTION WITH
F/A-18 AVB 561. WHICH REQUIRES INSPECTION FOR ADC POWER SUPPLY, P/N
4031003-915 AND REQUIRES MODIFICATION OF ALL 4031003-902 POWER
SUPPLIES TO THE -915 CONFIGURATION.
5. APPLICATION: (FMS REFER PARA 15. C)
A. BASIC EQUIPMENT: (LESS ATTRITION)
NOMEN TYPE PART NR NSN CAGE SER NRS QTY NOTE
DESIG
ADC CP-1334/A 4031000-912 6 610-01-156-9314 07187 ALL 280 ( i
)
NOTE (1): ADC. P/N 4031000-912 IS INSTALLED ON F/A-18A AIRCRAFT




NOMEN TYPE PART NR NSN CAGE SER NRS QTY
DESIG
ADC CP-1334/A 4031000-912 6610-01-156-9314 07187 ALL 2
6. COMPLIANCE: -
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MAINTENANCE NLT 180 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE,
PARTS AND MATERIALS. AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH AVB-561.
B TRAINERS.: N/A ...... _ _._ ......
C. SPARES: ASO TAKE THIS RAMEC FOR ACTION AND ENSURE
COMPLIANCE FOR ALL RETAIL AND WHOLESALE LEVEL ASSETS
MAN-HOURS REQUIRED:





























A. REQUIREMENTS FOR BASIC EQUIPMENT:
(1) PARTS /MATERIAL REQUIRED: REFER TO SI

























































































































(51) OBTAIN FROM FLEET READINESS ACTION GROUP (FRAG).
RECEIVING OFFICER. NAS NORTH ISLAND, NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, BLDG 94,
SAN DIEGO. CA 92135-5000, ATTN: EMMETT SALINDONG, CODE 3.5.2, DSN
735-3892 OR COML (619) 545-3892. REFER TO HONEYWELL P/N 3520420
PARTS BAG WHICH INCLUDES ALL SI SOURCE MATERIAL.
(52) REQUISITION THROUGH NORMAL SUPPLY CHANNELS
(2) PECULIAR GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REQUIRED: NONE
(3) PARTS/MATERIAL REMOVED:
QTY PART NO. CAGE NOMENCLATURE NSN DISPOSITION
1 M39003/01-2288 81349 CAPACITOR 5910--01--284--9035 Dl
1 RNC55H1243FS 81349 RESISTOR 5905--00--229--7699 Dl
1 RNC55H2001FS 31349 RESISTOR 5905--00--477--9176 Dl
1 4031017-10 07187 ID PLATE N/A Dl
1 AA4034246-511 07187 PROM 5962--01--157--8760 Dl
1 AA4034246-512 07 187 PROM 5962--01--154-. 1 C A O Dl
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(6) REMOVE THE (2) FROM PART NUMBER 4031005-912 ON THE
MEMORY CCA WITH ACETONE. CLEAN AREA WITH CLEANING COMPOUND. ALLOW
A FEW- MINU-T-ES-FOR- EVAPORATION. USING -BLACK-STENCIL-INK,- CHANGE PART
NUMBER OF MEMORY CCA TO 4031000-915 BY MARKING (5) IN AREA WHERE (2)
WAS REMOVED.
(7) APPLY INSULATING COMPOUND TO ALL MODIFIED AREAS ON
MEMORY CCA PER REF E WP 006 00.
(8) TEST MEMORY CCA REF DES A5 ON HTS . TPS ID 20414.
(9) REINSTALL MEMORY CCA REF DES A5 INTO ADC PER REF F WP
003 00.
(10) REMOVE OUTPUT DATA CONVERTER (ODC) CCA REF DES A10 PER
REF F WP 003 00.
(11) REMOVE INSULATING COMPOUND OVER CAPACITOR REF DES C3.
RESISTOR REF DES R52. AND LAST TWO NUMBERS (06) FROM PART NUMBER
4031010-906 WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND FOAM SWAB PER REF E WP 006
00. REFER TO REF F WP 010 00 FOR LOCATION OF C3 AND R52 ON ODC CCA
REF DES A10.
(12) UNSOLDER AND REMOVE CAPACITOR REF DES C3 AND RESISTOR
REF DES R52 FROM OCD CCA A10 PER REF E WP 007 00.
(13) SOLDER CAPACITOR, P/N M39003/01-6209 . IN C3 LOCATION AND
RESISTOR. P/N RNC55H1433FS, IN R52 LOCATION PER REF E WP 007 00.
(14) REMOVE THE (06) FROM PART NUMBER 4031010-906 ON THE ODC
CCA WITH ACETONE. CLEAN AREA WITH CLEANING COMPOUND. ALLOW A FEW
MINUTES FOR EVAPORATION. USING BLACK STENCIL INK, CHANGE PART
NUMBER OF ODC CCA TO 4031010-913 BY MARKING (13) IN AREA WHERE (06)
WAS REMOVED.
(15) APPLY INSULATING COMPOUND TO ALL MODIFIED AREAS ON ODC
CCA PER REF E WP 006 00.
(16) TEST ODC CCA REF DES A10 ON HTS, TPS ID 20418.
(17) REINSTALL ODC CCA REF DES A10 INTO ADC PER REF F WP 002
00.
(18) REMOVE POWER SUPPLY REF DES A3 PER REF F WP 003 00.
(19) DISASSEMBLE CHASSIS PER REF F WP 012 00 TO PROVIDE
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC COMPONENT ASSEMBLY (ECA) A12A1.
(20) UNSOLDER AND REMOVE RESISTOR, P/N ;RNC55H200 1FS , REF DES
A12A1R1, FROM TERMINALS A12A1-21 AND A12A1-22 PER REF E WP 007 00.
REFER TO REF E WP 012 00 FIGURE 8 TO LOCATE RESISTOR A12A1R1.
(21) SOLDER RESISTOR, P/N RNC5 5H511 1FS , IN A12A1R1 LOCATION
BETWEEN TERMINALS A12A1-21 AND A12A1-22 PER REF E WP 007 00.
(22) REASSEMBLE CHASSIS PER REF F. WP 012 00.
(23) PERFORM AVB 561. ,
(24) REMOVE EXISTING ADC ID PLATE/. P/N 4031017-10, BY
APPLYING A FEW DROPS OF MEK OR EQUIVALENT TO UPPER EDGE OF PLATE.
WORK MEK OR EQUIVALENT DOWN INTO ADHESIVE WHILE GRADUALLY PULLING ID
PLATE AWAY FROM CHASSIS.
(25) PREPARE SURFACE WHERE ADC ID PLATE IS TO BE APPLIED BY
CLEANING WITH CLEANING COMPOUND.
(26) REMOVE BACKING FROM NEW ID PLATE, P/N 4031017-10.
POSITION PLATE ON CHASSIS AND FIRMLY PRESS SURFACE TO ENSURE GOOD
ADHESION.
(27) MARK AVC 4651 ON ADC ID PLATE USING WHITE INK.
(28) INSTALL ADC TOP COVER AND TIGHTEN THE TWELVE CAPTIVE
SCREWS PER REF F WP 003 00.
(29) PERFORM ADC FUNCTIONAL TEST ON IATS OR ATS, TPS ID
74D050021.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL:
(1) VERIFY AVC 46 51 IS MARKED ON ADC ID PLATE AND AN AVB
561 DECAL IS APPLIED ON MODIFIED ADC, P/N 4031000-915.
(2) INSTALL ADC IN AIRCRAFT PER REF D WP 003 00.
(3) CLOSE DOOR 13R PER REF C WP 006 01.
(4) RETURN AIRCRAFT TO FLIGHT STATUS OR AS DIRECTED 3Y
MAINTENANCE CONTROL.
















1 AA4034246-518 07187 PROM
1 AA4034246-519 07187 PROM
1 AA4034246-520 07187 PROM
1 AA4034246-521 07187 PROM
1 AA4034246-522 07187 PROM
DISPOSITION: (Dl) SCRAP
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINERS








































(1) REMOVE ELECTRICAL AND HYDRAULIC POWER PER REF A WP 004
00 AND WP 009 00.
(2) INSTALL APPLICABLE SAFETY AND PROTECTIVE DEVICES PER
REF B WP 022 00, WP 023 00 AND WP 024 00.
(3) OPEN DOOR 13R PER REF C. WP 006 01.
(4) REMOVE ADC, P/N 4031000-912, PER REF D WP 003 00;
INSTALL CONDUCTIVE DUSTCAP OR ANTISTATIC GRID TAPE TO ADC CONNECTOR
RECEPTACLE FOR ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE (ESD) PROTECTION; AND INDUCT
ADC INTO INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MAINTAINANCE FACILITY FOR MODIFICATION.
B. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL: '
CAUTION
THE ADC CONTAINS ELECTROSTATIC
SENSITIVE DEVICES WHICH CAN BE
DESTROYED BY IMPROPER HANDLING,
TESTING PROCEDURES. PERSONNEL
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF E
(1) LOOSEN THE TWELVE CAPTIVE SCREWS AND REMOVE THE
COVER FROM THE ADC PER REF F WP 003 00.
(2) REMOVE MEMORY CCA REF DES A5. P/N 4031005-912. PER REF
F WP 003 00.
(3) REMOVE INSULATING COMPOUND FROM PROMS Ul THRU U12 AND
THE (2) OF PART NUMBER 4031005-912 WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND FOAM
SWAB PER REF E WP 006 00. REFER TO REF F WP 006 00 FOR LOCATION OF Ul
THRU U12 ON MEMORY CCA REF DES A5 .
(4) UNSOLDER AND REMOVE -511 THRU -522 EXISTING PROMS Ul
THRU U12 FROM MEMORY CCA REF DES A5 PER REF E WP 007 00.
(5) SOLDER NEW -621 THRU -642 PROMS Ul THROUGH U12 ON






























COMPLIANCE WITH THIS DIRECTIVE.
B." MAKE APPROPRIATE LOGBOOK ENTRY IK TECHNICAL DIRECTIVES
SECTION7—OPNAV 47S07-24A-AND7OR-IN--ATDR--LIST-NUMBER-2- AND- LIST NUMBER
4, AS APPLICABLE.
13. VERIFIED BY: MALS ELEVEN PER THEIR MESSAGE 080301Z JUN 95 ON
ADC S/N NJR00009.
14. RESCISSION DATE: 30JUN2001
15. RELATED INSTRUCTIONS/INFORMATION:
A. NADEP N.I. RAMEC 03-95 SUBMITTED BY REF H WAS NAVAIR APPROVED
BY CCB 961-0084 ON 04JAN96.
B. THIS TD WILL NOT BE FORMALIZED. FILE THIS COPY IN
APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL DATA FILE.
C. MDA HAS REVIEWED THIS RAMEC WITH RESPECT TO FMS EFFECTIVITY
AND HAS FOUND:
(1) APPLICATION TO BASIC EQUIPMENT
(A) SAF
NOMEN TYPE PART NR NSN CAGE SER NRS QTY NOTE
DESIG
ADC CP-1334/A 4031000-912 6610-01-156-9314 07187 ALL 9 (1)
(B) RAAF
ADC CP-1334/A 4031000-912 6610-01-156-9314 07187 ALL 33 (2)
NOTE (1): ADC, P/N 4031000-912 IS INSTALLED ON EF-18 AIRCRAFT
CE.15-1 THRU CE.15-8 AND CE . 15-13.
NOTE (2): ADC, P/N 4031000-912 IS INSTALLED ON AF/A-18 AIRCRAFT
A21-1 THRU A21-21 AND A21-101 THRU A21-114.
(2) APPLICATION TO SPARES
(A) SAF
NOMEN TYPE PART NR NSN CAGE SER NRS QTY
DESIG
ADC CP-1334/A 4031000-912 66 10-0 1- 156-S314 07187 ALL 3
(B) RAAF
ADC CP-1334/A 4031000-912 6610-01-156-9314 07187 ALL 2
D. MALS ELEVEN/REPORTING CUSTODIAN: MARK VERIFICATION ADC
S/N NJR00009 WITH AVC-4651.
E. PARTS /MATERIAL REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THIS CHANGE ARE AVAILABLE
IN THE SUPPLY SYSTEM. THE STOCK CHECK WAS CONDUCTED BY THE F/A-18
NADEP N.I. LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT OFFICE ON 13 OCT 1995.
F. NAVAVNDEPOT NORIS : (AS APPLICABLE) ;
(1) PROVIDE MICROFILM COPIES OF NEW/REVISED DRAWINGS TO
NATSF CODE 3122.
(2) PRPARE AND COORDINATE PUBLICATION UPDATES/PUB DATA
PACKAGES WITH NATSF CODE 21-1, AND
(3) PREPARE AND FORWARD DESIGN CHANGE NOTICES ( DCNS ) /SUPPLY
DATA TO ASO CODE 03611.
G. NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC:
(1) COORDINATE WITH NADEP NORIS AND MDA FOR TECH MANUAL/




N421B( 1 ) . . . ACT FOR COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIE(8)
00220/ 2/2148






APPENDIX D. SAMPLE POWER PLANTS CHANGE DOCUMENT
ROUTINE ACTION
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
WASHINGTON, DC 20361-4100
AIR-53611G/PSD 360F
ISSUE DATE: 31 Dec 94
RESCISSION DATE: 31 Dec 02
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C. Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and
their contractors to protect publications required for official use or for
administration or operational purposes only (see issue date). Other requests for
this document shall be referred to Commanding Officer, Naval Air Technical
Services Facilities, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5097.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE . For unclassified, limited documents, destroy by any method
that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
T58 POWER PLANT CHANGE NO. 158
(TDC 02)
SUBJECT : T58-GE-16 NO. 3 BEARING SUMP AREA — IMPROVED O-RINGS
(WUC 22400)
REFERENCE : (a) General Electric ECP No. 58T-15 of 31 Aug 93
(b) NAVAIR CCB No. 941-0094 approved 18 Jan 94
(c) NAVAIR 02B-105AHE-6-1 Intermediate Maintenance Manual,
Rapid Action Change 17 of 14 Dec 93
ENCLOSURE : Not applicable
DOCUMENTATION AFFECTED :
1. NAVAIR 02B-105AHE-4 Illustrated Parts Breakdown, Rapid Action
Change 1 of 8 Apr 93
2. NAVAIR 02B-105AHE-6-1 Intermediate Maintenance Manual, Rapid
Action Change 17 of 14 Dec 93
3. NAVAIR 02B-105AHE-6-2 Depot Maintenance Manual, Change 10 of
15 Oct 91
PURPOSE OF DIRECTIVE : This directive introduces/preformed packings (O-rings) of
improved material (Kalrez 4079) for the No. 3 Bearing Sump area of the T58-GE-16.
Kalrez 4079 has characteristics more compatible with the engine sump environment,
thus providing extended O-ring life and reducing the possibility of oil leakage
due to high temperature degradation of the O-ring. This change was proposed by
reference (a) and approved by reference (b).
APPLICATION :
1. BASIC EQUIPMENT:
The following engines shall be modified by service activities.
TYPE /MODEL /SERIES CONTRACT NO. SERIAL NO.
T58-GE-16 N00019-90-G-C237 216001 - 216999
2. TRAINERS: Not Applicable.
3. SPARES: Not Applicable.
COMPLIANCE :
1- This change shall be accomplished by retrofit at Intermediate and Depot
levels on next exposure to level required to incorporate.
0B70LDSS415Ba
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KIT IDENT NO. KIT NO.
Information only.
Comply with detailed
instructions on all engines at
next exposure to level required
to incorporate.
Comply with detailed
instructions on all engines at












1. REQUIREMENTS FOR BASIC EQUIPMENT:
a. Kit required:
QTY P/N CAGE NOMENCLATURE












57280 Preformed Packing PAG2Z2 5330-01-328-9905
35709 Preformed Packing PAGZZ2 5330-00-425-0649
35709 Preformed Packing PAGZZ2 5330-LL-W61-A606
b. Other material that may be required depending on condition of removed












99207 Tube Assy, Oil In
















c. Government furnished equipment (GFE) required: Not applicable.
d. Support Equipment Required: Not Applicable.
e. Source of Supply:




TS8 POWER PLANT CHANGE NO. 15 8
Parts/Material Removed and Disposition:
>TY P/N NOMENCLATURE SMSR NSN DISPOSITION
2 9169M40P106 Packing, Preformed PAGZZ2 5330-01-072--6673 (A)
2 9169M40P108 Packing, Preformed PAG2Z2 5330-01-076--4976 (A)
1 9169M40P223 Packing, Preformed PAGZZ2 5330-01-072--6677EQ (A)
2 2007T51P01 Shield, Heat PAGZZ3 2840-00-551--4052 (B)
1 4009T20P01 Tube Assy, Scavenge PAGZZ3 4710-00-003--8051 (B)
1 4018T02G01 Tube Assy, Oil-in PAGZZ3 4710-00-556--6235 (B)




2 R1468P007L Screw, Machine PAOZZ 5305-00-904--5809 (B)
Disposition: (A) Dispose of through local Property Disposal Officer.
(B) Retain for use, provided that part meets inspection
requirements of reference (c). If part does not meet
inspection requirements, replace part through normal
channels.
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINERS: Not applicable.
3. REQUIREMENTS FOR SPARES: Not applicable.
REIDENTIFICATION : Not applicable.
DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS :
1. Screen engine logbook for compliance with this directive. If this directive
has not been complied with, proceed as follows when installing oil nozzle, oil
scavenge tube, and oil-in tube in second stage turbine casing during engine
assembly.
2. Installation of No. 3 Bearing Sump Oil Nozzle, P/N 4023T80G01, and Preformed
Packing, P/N 4074T58P17.
NOTE
Ensure oil nozzle meets inspection requirements of
reference (c) prior to installation. If wear or damage
exceeds limits, replace nozzle.
a. Lubricate new Preformed Packing (15, Figure 1), P/N 4074T58P17, with Oil,
MIL-L-23699. Install packing on Oil Nozzle (14),,'P/N 4023T80G01. Relubricate
packing and install nozzle in No. 3 Sump ^Bearing Housing (12), P/N
6012T65G02/G04. Secure nozzle with two Screws (13), P/N R1468P007L. Torque
screws to 13-16 in-lb.
CAUTION
Safety wire must not obstruct the oil-in tube hole.
b. Safety wire (0.020 inch) the two screws, using the double twist method.
c. Continue processing in accordance with reference (c).
3. Installation of No. 3 Bearing Scavenge Tube Assembly, P/N 4009T20P01, and
Preformed Packings, P/N 4074T58P13.
NOTE
Ensure heat shield and scavenge tube meet inspection
requirements of reference (c) prior to installation. If
wear exceeds limits, replace part. Replace any heat
shields that contain holes.
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a. Lubricate two new Preformed Packings (16, Figure 1), P/N 4074T58P13, with
Oil, MIL-L-23699. Install packings in scavenge boss on No. 3 Sump Bearing
Housing, P/N 6012T65G02/G04 (12), ensuring packings are not pushed past groove
and into sump.
b. Proceed with Stage 2 turbine casing component buildup in accordance with
reference (c), WP 030, paragraph 25, steps b through 1, then proceed as follows.
CAUTION
Scavenge tube can cut packings if tool is not held
securely against end of tube during tube installation.
c. Place Heat Shield (3, Figure 2), P/N 2007T51P01, on Scavenge Tube (6),
P/N 4009T20P01. Lubricate Scavenge Tube Guide, P/N 21C4298G01 (7) and scavenge
tube with Oil, MIL-L-23699. Install aft end of wire segment (8) of scavenge tube
guide. Be sure conical plug segment (9) of scavenge tube guide is held securely
against Bcavenge tube.
d. Using scavenge tube guide, insert scavenge tube and heat shield through
stage 2 turbine casing (5), stage 3 nozzle (4), and preformed packings (2), at
six o'clock position.
e. Remove scavenge tube guide and secure scavenge tube assembly, using
coupling nut.
4. Installation of No. 3 Bearing Oil-in Tube, P/N 4018T02G01, and Preformed
Packings, P/N 4074T58P16.
NOTE
Ensure heat shield and oil-in tube meet inspection
requirements of reference (c) prior to installation. If
wear exceeds limits, replace part. Replace any heat
shields that contain holes.
a. Install Heat Shield (3, Figure 3), P/N 2007T51P01, over Oil-in Tube (5),
P/N 4018T02G01. Lubricate two new Preformed Packings (6), P/N 4074T58P16, with
Oil, MIL-L-23699, and install packings in groove on oil-in tube.
/
CAUTION
Heat shield can cut packing if 6hield is allowed to rest
against packing during tube installation.
WARNING
Exercise caution during oil-in tube installation to
prevent damage to preformed packings.
b. Lubricate packings with oil, MIL-L-23699. With casing raised so that
shield will not contact packing, install oil-in tube in casing at four o'clock
position. Secure with coupling nut on oil-in tube.
c. Continue processing in accordance with reference (c).
RECORDS AFFECTED:
1. Identify the change as T58 Power Plant. Change 158. Make appropriate Power
Plant logbook entry in the Technical Directive Section, OPNAV Form 4790/24A.
Submit VIDS/MAF OPNAV Form 4790/60 when reporting' compliance with this directive.
2. Component i6 not tracked by Scheduled Removal Component card. No SRC care
entry required.
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OPNAVINST4790.2C
TECHNICAL DIRECTIVES 1. TYPE
DIRECTIVE
l AIRCRAFT MODEL/EQUIPMENT NAME J. TYPE/MODEL/SERJES J. BUNO OR SERIAL NUMBER


















PPC 158 R (Sums) T58-GE-16 Improved (Activity) (Dale) (Signature)
O-ring, No. 3 Bearing
Sump Area
/'
OPNAV 4790/24A (Rev. 1-84)




"Cherry Po^pt NC 28533-0021
PREPARED BY : Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point NC, PSD 363
VERIFIED BY : Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point NC, PSD 363, MALS-26,
KCAS New River NC
59
T58 POWER PLANT CHANGE NO. 158
1. Nut 11. No;;le Baffle
2. Stage 3 Shroud Retainer 12. No. 3 Sumo Gearing Housing
3. Staae 3 Shroud 13. Screw
<. Bolt 14. Oil Nozzle
5. Outer Sump Cover IS. Preformed Packing
6. Inner Insulation Blanket 16. Preformed Packing
7. Stage 3 Turbine Nozzle 17. Snoulder Stud
8. Bearing Retaining Ring IS. Stage 2 Shroud
9. No. 3 Bearing Outer Race 19. Stage 2 Casing
10. Bolt 20. Nut
A- ?! 57
Figure 1. Components of Stage 2 Casing, Stage 3 Nozzle, and No. 3 Sump
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T5 8 POWER PLANT CHANGE NO. 158
1. No. 3 Sump Bearing Housing
2. Preformed Packing
3. Heat Shield
4. Stage 3 Nozzle
5. Stage 2 Turbine Casing
6. Scavenge Oil Tube
7. Scavenge Oil Tube Guide 21C4298G01
8. Aft End of Wire Segment
9. Conical Plug Segment
OOOTS8-776S01
Figure 2. Installation of Scavenge Oil Tube Using Guide 21C4298G01
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7. Scavenge Oil Tuoe
f
Figure 3. Stage 2 Casing External Components
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